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Since its beginning, research about cognitive representation of our bodies has debated 
over multiple representations models. Furthermore, recent years have seen a rise in the 
study of body representation disorders and related impairments. However, why human 
beings manifest so many deficits is still a mystery. Considering human evolution, frontal 
brain regions are well known for their changes in dimensions and connections. Less 
known is that parietal and temporal lobes encountered similar changes. These areas, 
especially in the right hemisphere, are crucial for body representation. Our hypothesis is 
that evolution of these areas determined a more varied and widespread cross wiring 
between the temporal and parietal lobes, increasing their communication pathways and 
their reciprocal influence. As such, these connections could lead to an increased 
probability of interconnected body and emotional disorders in humans. The prediction of 
this hypothesis is that all body representation disorders have an associated emotional 
component and vice versa. Evidence supporting the interconnection between emotional 
and body representation disorders derives from psychiatric diseases such as eating 
disorders. This hypothesis opens up new directions to understand body representation and 













We all share one feature. Independently form where we live, what kind of culture we 
belong to, and all the other variables one can think about, we have only one physical 
body. We can modify our body in terms of external appearance. It can become bigger or 
smaller by eating a lot of junk food or, on the contrary, tons of vegetables. It can be 
decorated by changing our skin colour through tanning beds or by adding nice jewellery. 
It can be loved or hated as sometimes happens in eating disorders, where the body is 
humiliated through food misuse. Finally, we can use it or not by being active sport 
players or lazy television watchers. In fringe cases, we can also exchange a part of our 
body with somebody else, like it happens for hand transplantations. However, we cannot 
change it completely as we change our dresses: we do not have an additional body, like a 
“seasonal body” for winter and for summer. 
Nevertheless, since its beginning, research on the cognitive representation of our body has 
debated over multiple body representations. One example for all is the famous dichotomy 
between the body schema and the body image, also known as the dyadic model of body 
representation [1]. Starting from the Nineteenth Century, descriptions of how we 
represent our bodies have begun to distinguish an action related representation, which 
includes postural and sensory information, and a conscious representation related to 
emotions and semantic knowledge [2,3]. This separation of concepts resembles the 
division of labour between the action and perception streams, or the ventral and dorsal 
streams model [4]. On one hand, we have concepts that are more linked to the perceptual 
frame (body image, sense of ownership). On the other hand, body schema and sense of 
agency are relatives of the dorsal stream, focused on acting on the environment. More 
  




recently, triadic models of body representation have been put forward to further define the 
body image concept, introducing a distinction between a body semantics and a body 
structural description, more concerned with the spatial localization of body parts [1]. 
Similarly, new developments of the concept of body schema have been proposed, 
involving a different role for somatosensory information [5].  
Independently from the theoretical reference assumed when studying body representation, 
recent years have seen a rise in the study of body representation disorders. The plethora of 
body representation impairments ranges from brain lesion-related deficits (such as 
somatoparaphrenia) [6] to psychiatric conditions involving a disturbance in the 
representation of the body (such as eating disorders) [7]. Especially these last conditions 
have attracted the attention of neuroscience, with the development of new paradigms 
aimed at clarifying the role of brain substrates in these diseases, once thought as 
psychological reactions to traumatic events without brain-based components.  
It is puzzling surveying how many conditions in human beings involve body 
representation disturbances in association with emotional impairments, especially if they 
imply a bidirectional route for symptoms (i.e.  Patients with eating disorders showing a 
modified body image even when they are in recovery, possibly as a consequence of the 
prolonged emotional impact on their perception; [7]). Could it be a coincidence or is there 
a causal role associating these two impairments? The hypothesis proposed here is that 
pathologies of body representation in humans might originate from the wiring of two 
precise brain areas: the parietal lobe and the temporal lobe. It is of uttermost importance 
to understand if complex conditions involving emotional components directed towards 
the body might involve also a dysfunctional representation of the body itself. This would 
open up the opportunity to develop new treatments or to tailor existing treatments to help 
  




patients restructure their image of the self (such as transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
(tDCS) protocols for stroke) [8]. 
 
The Hypothesis/Theory 
It is well known that brain regions have changed in terms of both dimension and 
connections through the evolution of humanity. The most known change from the animal 
brain to that of human beings is described for the frontal lobes. These areas have 
encountered a drastic evolution to accommodate language and executive functions 
abilities that are typical of humans [9–11].  
It is less known that also our parietal lobe encountered similar drastic changes. 
Particularly, the inferior region of the parietal lobe expanded (Inferior Parietal Lobe or 
IPL): area PG in Von Economo maps or area 39 in Broadmann’s classification are not 
found in the monkey brain [12]. These cortical regions are devoted to polymodal 
associative processes that involve responding to both visual and somatosensory stimuli 
[13]. Secondly, another area developed new properties: the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS, area 22 in Broadmann’s classification). One study reports STS asymmetries in the 
human brain, even in the foetal period, and these asymmetries are not described in 
monkeys [14]. Not by chance, this area also has polymodal visual and somatosensory 
properties [15]. Area 22 in Broadmann’s classification also expanded and auditory 
properties increased. These expansions took place especially in the right hemisphere of 
the human brain [15].  
Not by chance, the parietal and temporal lobes in the right hemisphere are the brain areas 
for body representation, and they are dysfunctional in all disorders that involve this 
component [16–18]. The idea that the evolution of these areas is responsible for body 
representation disorders shall not be taken as a localization of a disease. Rather, evolution 
  




and expansion of these areas determined a more varied and widespread cross wiring 
between the temporal and parietal lobes, increasing their communication pathways and 
increasing their reciprocal influence [19] (figure 1). Exactly the development of these 
connections could lead to an increase probability of interconnected body and emotional 
disorders in humans, rather than a focal change in a unique brain substrate.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Theories that support connection between body representation and emotions take into 
account a “bottom-up” direction, referring to the so called “material me” [20] instead of a 
holistic body representation. In 2002, Craig suggests that interoceptive sensations are the 
basis to build a subjective sensation and emotions [20]. Similarly, Damasio et al. (2000) 
[21] propose that emotions arise from an evolutionary mechanism functional for survival 
and implicated in maintaining homeostasis. Further emotions depend on structures related 
to the representation of the physical body according to these authors. Taken together, this 
evidence supports a functional relation between the physical body state representation and 
emotions. However, it does not clarify what happens at the “higher” level of body 
representation. It is plausible to think that, at this level, not only basilar bottom-up 
mechanism are implicated (i.e. interoceptive sensations) but also higher cognitive 
processes (i.e. cognitive amplification of interoceptive signals). The connection between 
emotions and body representation could be present in humans thanks to an increased 
connectivity between the right parietal and temporal lobes (figure 2). 
[Figure 2 here] 
This idea is also highly related to that of anatomical proximity or proximal contiguity. 
The concept of proximal contiguity is widely discussed in the (debated) “The Tell-Tale 
Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human” book by Ramachandran 
(Chapter 3) [22]. While the scientific controversy on oversimplification that the book 
  




might suffer is out of matter here, the concept and its description have an enormous value 
if one wants to understand the above-mentioned matters on body representation and 
evolution. Anomalous cross – wirings between brain areas have been suggested for some 
neurological conditions. This is the case of synaesthesia [23]. In this condition, 
individuals experience sensations in one modality when a second modality is stimulated. 
For instance, a person can experience a specific colour every time she encounters a 
grapheme (i.e., the letter “b” may be represented in association with the colour green). 
The anatomical proximity can explain synaesthesia as colour and visual grapheme areas 
in the brain are both in the fusiform gyrus and well connected to each other [24]. 
Anatomical proximity has also been called into cause for Capgras delusion, a condition in 
which the individual is convinced that his relatives have been substituted by an impostor 
[24]. Impairments in this condition spread over several tasks related to face perception 
and not only confined to the recognition of a familiar face [25,26]. Again, the neural basis 
of these tasks involve areas that are widely intercommunicating [24]. Paraphrasing a 
sentence: “Can it be a coincidence that the most common form of body representation 
disorder involves an emotional component – the reverse being also true - and the brain 
areas corresponding to these are right next to each other [and highly connected]?” 
(Modified from [23]). 
In summary, it appears more than plausible that without the evolution of our fine graded 
motor and emotional abilities, psychopathological conditions related to body 
representation would have never existed. These conditions could be the price we pay for 
being able to understand complex social situations and for being able to sew small things. 
As Peter Brugger noticed in his 2012 paper “Species have evolved to survive in all 
manner of barren and inhospitable environments and those that did survive have all 
reached a degree of specialisation that makes them unique in some way or another” (pag. 
  




357) [27]. Our evolution made us unique as well as other animals, and, as well as them, 
we pay the price of this uniqueness.  
Importantly, psychopathological conditions related to body representation affect only part 
of the population, and not every human being. However, the more time passes the more 
different subcategories emerge and new conditions are identified. While it is true that they 
might simply have been underestimated, there is no experimental proof they already 
existed as they manifest today. In any case, these complex conditions have been proven 
impossible to study unless all accounts, biological, psychological and social, are 
considered.  This reasoning applies equally to well-known body representation disorders 
such as anorexia nervosa, bulimia, binge eating and eating disorders in general as well as 
to some less known conditions. Somatoparaphrenia, for instance, involves a component of 
ownership but also an emotional one [28]. Body Integrity Identity Disorder is 
characterized by an overwhelming repulsion of the actual body representation, so deeply 
rooted to alter the entire individual’s emotional life [29]. All these conditions can be 
understood in terms of a profound dysfunctionality in the networks related to both body 
representation and emotional processing. This is exactly the network that encompasses 
the parietal and the temporal lobe.  
Evaluation of the hypothesis 
The prediction of this hypothesis is that all body representation disorders have an 
associated emotional component. On the other hand, the reverse should also be true: all 
emotional disorders should have associated body representation impairments.  
Evidence derives, on one hand, from psychiatric diseases and, on the other hand, from 
neuropsychological studies. However, not all evidence is so clearly supportive mainly 
because some studies considered only one process at time (emotion or body 
representation) and others explored the link between emotions and body representation 
  




focusing on interoceptive signals and how patients interpret them without considering the 
higher processes related to the temporo-parietal cortex (see table 1). 
[Table 1 here]. 
Consequences of the hypothesis and discussion 
Human evolution lead to huge changes in the brain wiring. While development of the 
frontal lobes has attracted a lot of attention from neuroscience given its link with 
language advancements [9–11], much less attention has been devoted to the massive 
rewiring of the inferior region of IPL and of STS. These areas do not have immediate 
homologous in the monkey brain [12,14] but they are crucial for human body 
representation [16–18]. Further, these same areas are impaired not only in 
neuropsychological disorders involving the body [37,40], but also in psychiatric 
conditions such as eating disorders and in personality disorders [33,48].  
The hypothesis proposed here is that the link between emotions and body representation 
found in all these conditions is a consequence of the evolution of parietal and temporal 
areas that has characterized human beings compared to other species. This widespread 
cross wiring increases the probability of joint disturbances of two functions that can be 
considered as anatomically proximal or contiguous [24]. Of relevance, this would mean 
that not only a “bottom-up” direction of influences [20,21] should be taken into account, 
but also “higher” levels of processing of both body representation and emotions.  
From a theoretical perspective, the current hypothesis opens new directions of thought for 
body representation, pointing towards the need to reason and plan studies in a holistic 
fashion. In some ways, the aim is to exceed the current debate between dyadic and triadic 
models [1]. The body image and the body schema would not need any more to be seen as 
representations, but rather they would better fit as components of a wider representation 
driven by the communication between highly and tightly wired brain areas.  
  




At a first look, this theory could be unsuitable from a research perspective. Considering 
one process at time allows to perform controlled experiments and to avoid the influence 
or bias from confounding variables.  However, unless the results from the different 
experiments are integrated in a common theory, the phenomenon cannot be explained by 
means of a fragmented approach. Occam's razor (or Ockham's razor or lex parsimoniae) 
is a principle used in logic that states that the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions 
should be selected among competing ones [49]. If this principle is applied to the study of 
body representation, there is no hypothesis with few assumptions, just a lot of 
assumptions separating the diverse processes that human beings can undergo when using 
their bodies. Moreover, there is no clear definition available for some of the components, 
such as the body image, and emotional aspects of body representation are ill defined 
problems and difficult to explore [1]. A unique theoretical frame integrating all the 
assumptions on body representation and emotions is still lacking, but this should not be 
considered as an experimental limitation impossible to overcome. 
From an experimental perspective, our hypothesis points towards a simple but efficient 
solution. Future experiments could take into account the relation between different 
processes, adding emotional measurements (such as affective batteries or classic 
interoceptive measurements) when performing classic body representation experiments. 
Furthermore, such an approach could also lead to comparative studies: interoceptive 
measurements are suitable for animals as well as humans [50,51]. If the hypothesis is 
true, experiments should be able to highlight differences between representations in 
humans and animals that are not only linked to anatomical differences (i.e. the diverse 
hand properties in a man versus a monkey and the associated differences in grasping 
kinematics) but also to functional wiring of body and emotional areas. Similarly, 
differences should emerge also in relation to sensitivity – or facilitation processes – if the 
  




human body representation has stronger connections with emotional areas than the animal 
one.  
More debatable is the lateralisation of the hypothesized evolutionary changes and, 
consequently, the lateralisation of the body representation. It is hypothesized that mainly 
the right side of the brain was involved in those changes, as reported by 
neuropsychological disorders previously reviewed [40,52]. Nevertheless, some authors 
showed different phenomena. For instance, some disturbances are characterized by left 
hemisphere lesions as well.  In autotopoagnosia patients make errors when asked to name 
or point to different body parts on their self or on the others [53,54]. Gerstmann syndrome 
sees patients manifesting left-right disorientation and finger agnosia [55]. Apraxia, in 
which the correct movement is not performed [56]. In none of that, emotional 
impairments are reported yet. However, this does not mean that impairments are not 
presents. Experiments could be able to highlight differences (if any) between processes 
implicated in right-hemisphere related pathologies and left-hemisphere related ones, to 
shed light on the lateralization debate. The left hemisphere and its related pathologies 
could be interpreted as the result of a loss of communication between the lexical-semantic 
domain, related but not coincided with the body representation processes [28].  
Considering the clinical side of such a hypothesis, it appears that the time has come to 
consider more widely symptoms in case of right brain damages. Hence, the need to 
explore both body representation and emotions in the clinical evaluation process and the 
related need to adopt or to develop neuropsychological assessment batteries in cases of 
right temporo and parietal damages. This statement is strictly related to the possibility to 
adopt new rehabilitation paradigms that might take into account the relation between 
body representation and emotions and that are not focused on body representation 
neuropsychological features only. For instance, therapies for somatoparaphrenia could 
  




include stimulation of brain areas with techniques such as tDCS [57]. This kind of 
technique allows to modulate an entire circuit of the brain and as such could boost body 
areas (parietal ones) while diminishing the control of emotional areas (temporal ones) that 
could be the cause of a release of “emotional disownership” towards part of the body 
(figure 3).  
[Figure 3 here] 
Importantly this technique has already proven effective on other similar symptoms such 
as anosognosia [8]. This patient, treated with tDCS, also showed an amelioration of 
mood, as observed by the experimenters. This is unlikely to be a chance effect and sounds 
promising for future applications. Similarly, the “circuit approach” could benefit other 
pathologies involving the body and emotional reaction, such as Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder and eating disorders.  Several treatments are available for eating disorders (e.g. 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy-CBT, Dialectical Behaviour Therapy-DBT, Cognitive 
Remediation Therapy-CRT) [58] but all of them are focused on the behavioural 
dysfunctions and emotional feelings, with only marginal consideration of the neural basis. 
In the light of the present hypothesis, alternative forms of treatment should be suitable. If 
connections between body representation and emotions, even in neural terms, are taken 
into account, classical rehabilitation methods used in neuropsychology could be 
implemented also for these conditions. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR). In fact, 
VR treatments have been recently developed for eating disorders and, not by chance, the 
mechanism proposed to be behind them is exactly an update of a system involving also 
spatial (so, body related) coordinates [59].  
In summary, a closer look at the evolution of body and emotional related areas provides a 
clear suggestion on the shift of paradigm needed to be able to understand impairments 
  




that possibly are the price we pay for being able to be social and emphatic human beings 
that can grasp a sewing needle.  
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Tables & Figures Caption 
 
 
Table 1. Example of studies exploring Body Representation (BR) and Emotional 
processing (Emo) in two different fields (Psychiatric and Neuropsychological). In all 
studied disorders, an involvement of both components is known from the literature. 
However, as the table highlights, not all studies consider both components at the same 
time.  The inclusion of the studies in the vestibular field is useful because it represents the 
most convincing evidence of the link between BR and Emo. Vestibular stimulation (e.g. 
Caloric Vestibular Stimulation-CVS or Galvanic Vestibular Stimulation-GVS) has a great 
influence on both body representation, due to the well documented overlap between 
vestibular and somatosensory networks [44]. Less known, vestibular stimulation 
influences also emotional processes [45]. As the vestibular system is not a primary area 
for emotional processing, interfering with it means changing the connection between 
temporo and parietal cortices [46,47]. These experiments are the only directly confirming 
the hypothesis proposed here, and they support the idea of changes in communication 
within the evolutionary hub of emotions and body representation. The third column 
describes the type of clinical populations. “Function explored” column indicates for each 
study which component has been taken into account (an X indicates if the function is 
explored). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the expansion occurred during evolution of the 
connections between Parietal and Temporal lobe from both a functional (on the left) and 
an anatomical (on the right) point of view. The functional point of view refers to the 
processes related to the parietal and temporal lobe respectively. BR: body representation; 
  




Emo: emotion. Bigger arrows represent greater wiring between areas and greater 
interaction between processes.  
 
Figure 2. Interaction between emotion and body representation processes related to the 
self-perception from both a functional (on the left) and an anatomical (on the right) point 
of view. BR: body representation; Emo: emotion. The figure depicts the idea that the 2 
processes are not separated, rather they are integrated in order to have a coherent sense of 
the self. Similarly, it is proposed that anatomically the intercommunication between areas 
generates a sense of the self, and not simply the activity in one or another area.  
 
Figure 3. Treatment perspective based on the use of tDCS. The upper figure represents a 
possible placement of the anode electrode on the parietal lobe and the cathode electrode 
on the temporal lobe, in order to stimulate body compared to emotional related areas. This 
approach might benefit for instance eating disorder patients. The kind of montage to be 
chosen would depend on the kind of result that one would want to obtain. In general, as 
depicted by the bottom part of the figure, boosting one hub of the network would aim at 
rebalancing activations. BR: body representation; Emo: emotion. 
  
  




























     
    Function Explored 








Mussgay et al. 
[30] 
1999 Patients with 
psychosomatic disorder 
X X 
Müller et al. 
[31] 
2015 Patients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
X X 
Pollatos et al. 
[32] 









Terhaar et al. 
[34] 
2012 Patients with depression X X 
Hart et al. [35] 2013 Patients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
X X 
Michal et al. 
[36] 

















Critchley [37] 1974 Patients with misoplegia X X 
McIntosh et 
al. [38] 
2000 Neglect patients X  
Lindell et al. 
[39] 
2007 Patients with unilateral 





2013 Patients with  autoscopy X X 
Pollak et al. 
[41] 





2004 Patients with vestibular 
neuronitis 
 X 
Sang et al. 
[43] 
2006 Patient with peripheral 
vestibular disease 
 X 
 
 
 
